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By 1 etter of 29 January 1990 the Committee on Budgetary Control requested 
authorization to draw up a report on strengthening Parliament's powers of 
budgetary control in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union. 
At the sitting of 2 Apri 1 1990 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the committee had been authorized to report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 30 May 1990 the Committee on Budgetary Control appointed 
Mrs GOEDMAKERS rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 19-21 September 1990 the committee considered the draft 
report and adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote : Price, Chairman; Wynn, Vice-Chairman; 
Goedmakers, Rapporteur; Funk (replacing Langes); Marck, Saridakis, Schodruch, 
Sierra Bardaji (replacing Papoutsis); Tomlinson and Wettig. 
The report was tabled on 27 September 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments wi 11 appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on strengthening Parliament's powers of budgetary control in the context of 
Parliament's strategy for European Union 
T~~ European Parliament, 
- having regard to its resolutions of 
11 July 1990 on the European Parliament's guidelines for a draft 
Constitution for the European Union, and in particular paragraph 11 
thereof1 , 
11 July 1990 on the Intergovernmental Conference in the context of 
Parliament's strategy for European Union, and in particular paragraphs 
30, 36, 37 and 40 thereof2 
12 July 1990 on the principle of subsidiarity3 , 
12 July 1990 on the preparation of the meeting with the national 
parliaments to discuss the future of the Community (the ~Assizes'), and 
in particular recital B thereof4 , 
- having regard to Rule 121 of the Rules of Procedure, 
- having regard to the report by its Committee on Budgetary Control 
(Doe. A3-0233/90) 
A. whereas the democratic deficit in the Community can only be offset to the 
extent that wider powers are attributed to it, not only in the 
legislative area but also in its budgetary control powers in relation to 
the Council, the Commission, the other Community institutions and the 
national administrations exercising decentralized Community management 
powers, 
B. whereas the political mo~itoring function rises to particular prominence 
in the budgetary area in terms commensurate with the importance that the 
budget assumes for European economic convergence and in anticipation of 
economic and political union, 
C. whereas the financial provisions of the EEC Treaty (Articles 199 to 209) 
do not accord the political monitoring function that Parliament exercises 
in relation to the budget the importance that it is due, 
1. Reiterates the need for budgetary control powers to be strengthened in 
order to offset a democratic deficit that could well become a permanent 
feature of European Union if the present allocation of powers between the 
Institutions were to be maintained; 
1ooc. A3-165/90 
2ooc. A3-166/90 
3 ooc. A3-163/90 
4Doc. A3-162/90 
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2. Emphasizes that strengthening budgetary control will lead to increased 
effectiveness in all aspects of Community revenue and expenditure; 
3. Considers that the Parliament op1n1on, provided for under Article 236 of 
the EEC Treaty, on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference for 
Political Union, should refer to the enlargement anq strengthening of the 
budgetary control function as one of the fundamental problems to be 
debated; 
4. Considers that the strengthening of powers of control should be vis-a-vis 
the Council, the Commission, the other Community institutions and 
national administrations inasmuch as these bodies exercise decentralized 
Community functions; 
5. Considers that cooperation between the European Parliament and the Court 
of Auditors should be increased; 
6. Stipulates here and now that if there is to be genuine consolidation of 
the institutional system of budgetary control, the Treaties will have to 
be amended and completed, so as to take cognizance of the following 
requirements, which in part have already been accepted in practice and 
recognized under the Financial Regulation; 
As to the nature of budgetary control: 
(a) The budgetary management system must enable Parliament to intervene 
as appropriate in the course of the financial year and act in advance 
of the control exercised after the event through the discharge 
procedure; to that end, the Commission shall provide the budgetary 
authority with all documentation necessary (amendment to Article 205 
of the EEC Treaty); 
(b) Controls should relate not only to the implementation of the budget 
but also to the sound management of policies having a budgetary 
impact and the assessment of results; in addition to securing 
legitimacy and regularity, they should be aimed at monitoring the 
effectiveness of operations and the sustainability of their effects 
(amendments to Articles 206a and 206b of the EEC Treaty); 
(c) The Treaty must throw into relief the status of the decision granting 
discharge, both as the final act in the assessment of responsibility 
of the Commission or its Members (inasmuch as the responsibilities of 
the latter can be clearly specified;) 
As to the object of control 
(d) The discharge procedure must encompass all budgetary operations that 
are not already subject to control (borrowing/lending) or that follow 
specific rules (ECSC, EDF) (adaptation of Articles 206a and 206b of 
the EEC Treaty}; 
As to the effectiveness of parliamentary acts of budgetary control 
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(e) Observations forming an integral part of the decision granting 
discharge or of other of Parliament's resolutions relating to the 
area of budgetary control must be backed by the power of enforcement 
on the Institutions concerned (widening of the provision of Article 
206b of the EEC Treaty} 
(f) The treaties must enshrine the principle that the decision on 
discharge entails the responsibility of the Commission or of its 
members specifically responsible at the highest level, and that the 
refusal to grant discharge is the political equivalent of a motion of 
no confidence; 
As to interinstitutional relations in the matter of budgetary control: 
I 
(g) The principle of democratic transparency and of freedom of 
information, should be enshrined in the Treaties by making it an 
obligation on the Commission, the other Community Institutions and 
the Member States to supply such information to Parliament as it may 
request in its capacity as political and control authority and, where 
necessary, investigating authority; as investigating authority 
Parliament should enjoy legal powers comparable to those of the 
Parliaments of the Member States (e.g. the power to call and take 
evidence from any Community citizen, official or otherwise, who can 
give relevant information and to require production by them of 
relevant documents}; 
(h) The ro 1 e of the Court of Auditors as the i nst it uti on of techn i ea 1 
control responsible to Parliament as the polit~cfl control authority, 
should be strengthened in the Treaties by provid1ng for: 
Parliament's right to ask the Court of Auditors to carry 
out investigations and submit reports; 
Parliament's power to give its approval to the 
appointment of the Members of the Court of Auditors; 
(i} The position of the Court of Auditors should be enhanced by making it 
a Community Institution; 
(j) Parliament should have the right of recourse to the Court of Justice 
to seek for annulment, to consult the Court in respect of any matter 
regarding the interpretation of the Treaties, and to enforce its 
right to information as provided by these Treaty amendments; 
( k) The Court of Justice should have the power to impose sanctions, 
including financial ones where appropriate, for violations of the 
obligations in question; 
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Parliaments and 
Governments of the Member States, and to use this resolution as a basis 
for the texts it submits to preparatory meetings for the 
I ntergovernmenta 1 Conference, the meeting with the nation a 1 parliaments 
and meetings of the European Council. 




I. !'lli1 SHOU_L_Q_p_~R-~!~MENT'_~~UDGETARY CONTR9L POWERS BE STRENGTHENED? 
The adoption (in 1988) of normative measures - the 'DEll ors package' - and, 
subsequently, of the revised Financial Regulation (13 March 1990) profoundly 
changed the framework of Community budget management: provision for a more 
stringent budgetary discipline, such as results both from the Council decision 
of 24 June 1988 and the Interinstitutional Agreement, and the embodiment in 
the Financial Regulation of the cost-effectiveness safeguard clause all 
require increasingly intensive controls over the management of Community 
finances and their normative sources. 
Moreover, the increasing sensitivity of public opinion to the subject of 
combating fraud against the Community budget, launched throughout Europe with 
the hearing of the Committee on Budgetary Control in ~anuary 1989, justifies 
consolidation of political control of the legitimacy, r~gularity and long-term 
effectiveness5 of budgetary activity in a European area without internal 
frontiers. 
It is important to highlight the fact that in this transitional stage in the 
life of the Community the strengthening of the European Parliament's budgetary 
control powers takes on a very particular political significance. 
There is in fact a very close link between the European Parliament's budgetary 
control and the elimination of the democratic deficit that the European 
Parliament is calling for as part of its strategy for European Union. 
Parliament has asserted in this connection in its resolution of 12 July 1990 
on the meeting with the national parliaments that 'the only way to overcome 
this deficit is to grant the European Parliament the legislative and 
monitoring powers not enjoyed by the national Parliaments over the Council as 
a whole and over the Commission' (recital B). It has also insisted that 'any 
extension of Community competence requires modification of the Treaties' 
(resolution of 12 July 1990 on the principle of subsidiarity - paragraph 2), 
and that the Treaties should be modified in the context of the December 1990 
Intergovernmental Conference, and on the basis of a constitution to be 
prepared by the European Parliament (cf. paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution 
of 11 July 1900 on the Intergovernmental Conference in the context of 
Parliament's strategy for European Union). 
The strengthening of Parliament's powers of control, in particular in the area 
of the budget, is thus an integral part of the strategy to offset the 
democratic deficit in the context of initiatives to secure political union. 
This problem must be raised at all the 'assizes' that are to be held to 
prepare for union: interparliamentary meeting in November, preparatory 
Interi nst i tut ion a 1 Conference, Intergovernmenta 1 Conference in December. 
Finally, the op1n1on Parliament is to deliver in anticipation of the 
Intergovernmental Conference pursuant to Article 236 of the Treaty should 
take account of the requirements to be set out in this report. 
5 Control of which will require verification of the use of resources 
over time, as recommended by the Brundtland Committee. 
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11. THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis to be carried out will be aimed at exploring the subjects covered 
by the Martin report: that report was in fact confined to identifying general 
problems arising in the area of budgetary control, but was unable to consider 
them in more detail because of the large number of i nst it uti on a l problems 
covered. 
The interim report aims at identifying the problems that arise in 
strengthening Parliament's powers of budgetary control and the political 
solutions that might be given at the level of amendments to the Treaties, 
pursuant to the request Parliament submitted in its resolution of 11 July on 
the Intergovernmental Conference {Articles 204 to 209 of the Treaty, relating 
to financial provisions, 'must be adapted'}. 
Your rapporteur reserves the right to draw up a final report setting out the 
regulatory and institutional mechanisms that might ~e used to bring about 
advances in constitutional practice in the Commu~ity on the basis of 
guidelines so established, even before these principles come to be enshrined 
in the Treaties. 
The aspects of control to be considered here relate to: 
{a} the nature of the controls; 
{b) their purpose; 
{c) their effectiveness 
{d) interinstitutional relations in the context of control. 
I 11. NATURE OF THE CONTROLS: ENSHRINING THE ENLARGEMENT OF POWERS IN THE 
TREATIES 
The EEC Treaty gives only a very limited idea of the function of control; it 
provides for the 'discharge to the Commission on the implementation of the 
'''tdget' which is 'given' by Parliament on the recommendation of the Council 
(Article 206b}. 
It follows from this provision: 
(a) That the nature of parliamentary control is such that monitoring can only 
take place after the event on past financial years; 
(b) That it would appear to be confined to the implementation of the budget 
and the legitimacy of operations, and not to monitoring of standards of 
management or the effectiveness of policies with budgetary impact, or the 
long-term impact of results and their assessment; 
(c) That the sovereign power of Parliament in granting discharge, recognized 
by the Financial Regulation {Article 89 of the revised version) is not 
stipulated explicitly. 
The practice that has long since become established over many financial years, 
and which is now enshrined in a number of provisions of the Financial 
1egulation, nevertheless shows that genuinely effective parliamentary control 
·1ill require the option of intervening in the course of implementation, and 
,n relation not only to the level of utilization of budgetary appropriations 
out also the effective management of policies in operation. Nothing short of 
tolis form of control can allow satisfactory assessment and result in a 
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politically responsible decision on whether or not to grant discharge to the 
Commission and the other institutions. 
Specifying the exact 
greater prec1s1on in 
acknowledged: 
nature of budgetary 
the Treaties; the 
control consequently 
fo 11 owing will have 
requires 
to be 
(a) The need for continuous control in the course of the financial year over 
expenditure policies; monitoring of management will have to be assisted, 
at a higher level, by monitoring of legislation, aimed at ensuring that 
the expenditure mechanisms provided for on new legal bases guarantee a 
satisfactory level of cost effectiveness; 
(b) That this form of control must be applied not only to the implementation 
of budgetary appropriations and the legitimacy of operations, but also to 
standards of management and effectiveness of policies having a budgetary 
impact, and to the long-term effectiveness of their outcome, and to their 
assessment; 
(c) The status as a sovereign act of the decision granting discharge, as the 
final act in the political assessment of the Commission's responsibility. 
IV. THE OBJECT OF BUDGETARY CONTROL 
Pursuant to the EEC Treaty the purpose of budgetary control is to 'examine the 
accounts and the financial statement' submitted by the Commission (Article 
206b). A series of financial operations that are not part of the general 
budget consequently evades financial control, at least in terms of the 
Treaties: 
- Community borrowing and lending operations (the management account provides 
them only with a token entry); 
- the European Development Fund (EDF - a parliamentary discharge is provided 
for, by the specific financial regulations, not on the basis of the Treaty 
but under an internal Council agreement); 
- the financial statements and the ECSC operating budget (the budgetary 
practice of granting discharge to the Commission is not supported by any 
Treaty provisions). 
The political significance of these budgetary and financial circumstances 
clearly implies that parliamentary control, as provided for under the 
Treaties, should be explicitly extended to these areas. 
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL ACTS OF BUDGETARY CONTROL 
If the discharge can be refused or deferred what is the sanction that can give 
concrete effect to such a negative act? No reference is made to this in the 
Treaty (or in the Financial Regulation either). Nor does the EEC Treaty 
stipulate what status should be attributed to Court of Auditors special 
reports. 
Moreover, the remarks contained in the resolution forming part of the 
decision granting discharge (Article 89(4) of the Financial Regulation) do 
not, in terms of the Treaty, have compulsory force vis a vis the Institutions 
concerned. 
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The prov1s1on of political or even judicial sanctions is a sine qua non of an 
effective control function. The Treaty should consequently stipulate that: 
- The decision granting discharge commits the political responsibility of the 
Commission or of its Members at the highest level and that refusal to grant 
discharge is equivalent to a motion of no confidence, (Parliament would be 
free to draw the consequences at institutional level by taking a vote on a 
censure motion), 
- The remarks forming an integral part of the discharge decision have the 
force of compulsion in relation to the Institutions concerned (a request to 
have the 'remarks' in the discharge decision made compulsory has already 
been included in the above mentioned resolution of 11 July 1990 on the 
Intergovernmental Conference- para. 37); 
-The resolutions that Parliament adopts in relation tq budgetary control 
externa 1 to the discharge procedure have the same force of compulsion in 
relation to the Institutions concerned as the resolution forming an integral 
part of the discharge decision. 
VI. INTERINSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BUDGETARY CONTROL 
Cooperation between the European Institutions is essential to ensure efficie11t 
standards of coordination in the monitoring of the management of the extensive 
range of Community policies. 
That cooperation should be widened to include the national administrations, 
having regard to the growing decentralization of Community policy management 
activities that the Commission is in the process of accomplishing with the 
application of the subsidiarity principle. 
Yet this is another area for which no specific arrangement exists in the 
financial provisions of the Treaties. 
The strengthening of Parliament's budgetary control function would in 
particular require: 
a) Transparency of information to be enshrined in the Treaty by making it an 
obligation on the Commission and the Member States to provide Parliament 
with all necessary information. That obligation, contained in Article 2 
of the revised Financial Regulation, is all the more important in 
consideration of the difficult that Parliament would otherwise have in 
keeping track of decentralized Community fund management arrangements; 
b) Parliament, in exerc1s1ng its political control function, to be 
authorized to hold inquiries, with an obligation on the Commission, the 
other Community Institutions and the Member States to supply all 
necessary information, in particular in cases of inquiries conducted in 
the area of the budget; Parliament's powers should have a judicial 
character, as in the case of the parliaments of a number of Member States 
(Italy, France, Netherlands, Germany, UK, etc.); the European Parliament 
should be empowered to summon civil servants and private citizens, and to 
hear them as witnesses under oath; 
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c) Parliament should enjoy a right of recourse to the Court of Justice for 
all violations of obligations incumbent upon the Commission, the 
Community Institutions and the Member States exercising decentralized 
management, inasmuch as such obligations result from statements contained 
in the discharge decision, resolutions adopted by Parliament in relation 
to budgetary control, or the right to information that the Treaty will 
eventually provide in favour of Parliament; 
d) The Court of Justice to be given the power to impose sanctions, including 
financial sanctions, for violations of obligations as set out in (c) 
above (cf. paragraph 29 of the re solution of 11 July 1990 on the 
Intergovernmental Conference); 
e) The role of the Court of Auditors, as the institution of technical 
control answerable to Parliament, itself the political control authority, 
to be strengthened by stipulating the following in the Treaty: 
Parliament's right to obtain from the Court of Auditors reports on 
any subject relating to the area of budgetary control; 
Parliament's power to appoint members of the Court of Auditors. 
It should be stressed in this connection that the Court of Auditors can be 
expected to develop its full potential to the extent that it can establish 
close links of cooperation with the Institutions for which its indispensable 
activities are intended, and in the first instance with the European 
Parliament. 
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